The Transactional Ballot: Institutional Failures and Civic Complicity in Nigeria's Post-2022 Electoral Landscape

By Odudu Riches

June 2026

 

The build-up to Nigeria's 2023 general elections was marked by an unprecedented wave of democratic optimism. With the passage of the Electoral Act 2022, citizens were promised a technologically driven electoral process capable of preventing traditional forms of election fraud such as ballot snatching and multiple voting. The introduction of the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) and the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV) by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was expected to usher in a new era of transparency and credibility.

 

However, the transition from the promises of the 2022 reforms to the conduct of the 2023 elections under President Bola Ahmed Tinubu's administration exposed a painful reality: while technology advanced, institutional integrity failed to keep pace. Electoral malpractice evolved rather than disappeared. Instead of ballot-box snatching dominating the process, vote-buying and transactional politics became widespread. Institutional weaknesses, combined with widespread poverty, transformed the democratic right to vote into a commodity. Many citizens accepted money or food in exchange for their votes, sacrificing long-term governance for immediate survival.

 

1. Technological Sabotage and Institutional Malpractice

 

The primary source of Nigeria's recent electoral challenges lies in institutional weakness rather than technological failure. During the 2023 presidential election, BVAS largely succeeded in reducing identity fraud at polling units. However, the major breakdown occurred during the electronic transmission of results.

 

The repeated delays in uploading presidential polling-unit results to the IReV portal severely damaged public confidence in the electoral process. Reports by domestic and international observer groups, including YIAGA Africa and the European Union Election Observation Mission, noted that the lack of real-time transparency created opportunities for suspicion, disputes, and allegations of result manipulation. Rather than strengthening accountability, failures in implementation undermined the credibility of otherwise promising technological reforms.

 

2. The Mechanism of Vote Trading: The "See and Buy" System

 

As traditional electoral fraud became more difficult, political actors increasingly shifted their resources toward direct voter inducement. This gave rise to the highly organized "see and buy" system, in which voting became a commercial transaction.

 

During the 2023 general elections and subsequent off-cycle gubernatorial elections in states such as Imo, Bayelsa, Kogi, and Edo, reports of vote buying became widespread. Voters were allegedly instructed to display their thumbprinted ballot papers to party agents before casting them as proof of compliance. Once verified, they were directed to nearby locations where they received cash payments ranging from ₦2,000 to ₦14,000 or food items such as rice, spaghetti, salt, and branded wrappers.

 

These short-term rewards often provided only temporary relief and could not compensate for the long-term consequences of electing unaccountable leaders.

 

3. Civic Complicity and the Poverty Trap

 

While political actors bear significant responsibility for electoral corruption, citizens must also acknowledge their role in sustaining the system. The relationship between politicians and voters has gradually shifted from democratic representation to mutual transactional exploitation.

 

This civic complicity is driven largely by severe economic hardship. Following the removal of the petrol subsidy and the floating of the naira after 2023, rising inflation and the increasing cost of living pushed millions of Nigerians into survival mode. Under such conditions, an election-day payment of ₦10,000 may appear more valuable than the uncertain promise of good governance over the next four years.

 

Consequently, many voters now view election day not as an opportunity to choose accountable leaders but as a rare chance to recover a small portion of public resources from politicians whom they believe will neglect them after assuming office.

 

Conclusion

 

Resolving this crisis requires a two-pronged approach. Structurally, Nigeria must strengthen the independence of the electoral commission by insulating it from executive interference and making electronic transmission of election results a mandatory legal requirement. Equally important is sustained civic education aimed at eliminating the culture of vote trading. Only when citizens reject transactional politics and embrace their role as active guardians of democracy can Nigeria achieve elections that truly reflect the will of the people.